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This paper examines the sources of fluctuations in inflation and output in two leading transition-
economy candidates for admission to the European Union (EU), Poland and Hungary. Using a
rational expectations, dynamic open economy aggregate supply- aggregate demand model, we
consider real oil price, supply, balance of payments, demand, and monetary disturbances
incorporating important features of transition economies such as balance of payments disturbances
and finite capital mobility. Evidence indicates that supply shocks explain a sizable portion of price
level movements in Hungary while demand shocks are dominant in price level movements in
Poland. Monetary shocks are an important source of output fluctuations in the short run in
Hungary suggesting nominal inertia. In Poland, real demand shocks affect output in the short run
(up to one year), while monetary shocks are negligible. Estimates of “core inflation” based on
historical realizations of the shocks suggest that a major component of inflation has been demand
driven, “core” inflation. Finally, policy implications of these findings regarding EU membership
are evaluated.
JEL Classicication Codes: E3, P2, O5, C5
Keywords: Business Cycles, Inflation, Transition Economies, Time Series Models1
1. Introduction
A significant economic and political challenge facing the transition economies of central
and eastern Europe is to join the European Monetary System (EMS) and thus achieve full
membership in the European Union (EU). The successful accession to membership in the EU by
the current transition-economy applicants, the Czech Republic, Hungary, the Slovak Republic,
Slovenia and Poland, will depend to a large extent on their ability to align themselves with the
macroeconomic policies of the EU. Thus, an important task for the policymakers in the accession
countries is to lower the inflation rate and, at the same time, to raise output per capita to a level
approaching EU average. Although all transition economies have made a substantial progress in
lowering inflation over time, their current inflation levels can be best described as “moderate”,
ranging between 10 to 20 percent, still well above the average EU level.  On the other hand, the
output growth rate in the candidate countries has been somewhat faster than that of the EU,  but
these economies need to exceed the average EU growth level by a large amount for a sustained
period of time if their living standards are to approach EU standards.
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the sources of movements in inflation and
output in two leading transition- economy candidate countries, Hungary and Poland. 
1
Understanding the forces underlying inflation and output growth can help policymakers become
better prepared for full membership in the EU and also allow them to design credible policies
before they establish any  formal link to the Euro.  Among the performance measures that most
observers would view as important markers of credibility for joining the EMS are inflation and
output growth. In addition, some  transition economies, such as the Czech Republic and Poland
have been pursuing a policy of inflation targeting to better control and reduce inflation. Therefore,2
an empirical analysis of inflation rate movements is useful for monetary authorities in these
countries, and their experience may provide important lessons for other transition economies.
Price stability has been an important policy goal for all transition policymakers since the
beginning of transition efforts in early 1990s. Inflation is often blamed for major distortions in the
economy, lack of foreign direct investment, appreciation of the real exchange rate, and worsening
of the income distribution. Hence, it is particularly important to better understand the extent to
which inflation is a demand driven, core inflation phenomenon. In this paper, we also construct a
measure of core inflation for Poland and Hungary. If a substantial portion of total inflation is
demand driven or core inflation, then there is room for policies aimed at limiting discretionary
demand  to bring down inflation and stabilize the economy. Looking forward, our results suggest
that a major component of inflation in the two countries has been demand driven.
Brada (1998) and Desai (1997, 1998) argue that different initial conditions and different
starting times of stabilization programs result in different paths for macroeconomic variables, such
as output, prices, and real exchange rates. Different approaches to monetary policy may also lead
to different behavior in these variables. Hungary began implementing stabilization programs much
earlier than Poland and these two countries have also adapted different monetary policy stance
and had different initial conditions. Dibooglu and Kutan (2001) provide empirical evidence that
real exchange movements in Poland and Hungary during 1990-99  were affected by different
factors. In this paper, we also test the validity of arguments made by Brada (1998) and Desai
(1997, 1998) about the behavior of prices and output by providing evidence from Poland and
Hungary.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide an overview3
of macroeconomic policy in Hungary and Poland. Section 3 describes our methodology. In
section 4, we describe data employed and present our empirical results.  Section 5 discusses
policy implications of our findings and concludes.
2. An Overview of Macroeconomic Policy in Hungary and Poland
2.1.  Hungary
Initially, at the beginning of the 1990's, Hungary followed a gradualist macroeconomic
policy as the authorities sought to balance the desire for reducing inflation with the need to
control the government deficit and to service a large external debt. Too large a reduction in
inflation would have reduced government revenues and increased expenditures on the social
safety net, thus increasing the government's need to borrow abroad. The official exchange rate
was tied to a currency basket consisting of 50 percent U.S. dollar and 50 percent German mark
weights until May 1994, when the weights for the reference basket changed to 70 percent ECU
and 30 percent U.S. dollar. Monetary policy included active exchange rate management based on
a currency peg with a narrow band of permitted fluctuations (Kutan and Brada, 2000).
The initial exchange rate policy, which aimed at a real appreciation of the forint to help
combat domestic inflation, was found to be too costly because of the declining competitiveness of
Hungarian exports and sluggish growth. Moreover, it failed to provide a nominal exchange rate
anchor to reduce inflationary expectations. These costs began to appear in 1993, when the current
account deficit reached 9% of GDP and then increased to 9.4 % the following year. At the same
time, the government’s budget deficit remained unacceptably high (Table 1).  The fact that the
foreign debt was also growing steadily put Hungary at risk of insolvency. This macroeconomic
situation was certainly not sustainable. 4
During the 1990 to 1994 period, a loose fiscal policy lead to growing budget deficits and a
high level of foreign debt. Financing this deficit required monetary expansion as well as high
interest rates so that commercial banks would find government securities attractive, thus fueling
the inflation that the strong forint policy had sought to reduce. The disinflation policy combined
with a fixed exchange rate resulted in continuous real appreciation, causing a loss of
competitiveness and high current account deficits.  The persistence of these twin deficits (Table 1)
created uncertainty among Hungary’s foreign creditors as well as concerns about the stability of
the forint.
The two conflicting priorities of the government, control of inflation and improving
international competitiveness, led to speculation against the forint, which undermined the
credibility of the exchange rate regime. Liberalization of foreign exchange operations and the
continuous real appreciation of the forint, resulting in significant capital inflows, gradually
narrowed the ability of the monetary authorities to control the money supply. Moreover, during
this period, there was no coordination between monetary and fiscal policy (Nemenyi, 1997). 
The 1994 Mexican crisis further worsened Hungary’s ability to borrow in international
markets as the risk premium increased for emerging markets.  The government realized that it
could not sustain the dual objectives of controlling inflation and improving international
competitiveness at the same time and, as a result, announced a major fiscal adjustment program in
March 1995 [Szapary and Jakab (1998)]. Fiscal policy was tightened to reduce the twin deficits
through lower government expenditures, higher import tariffs, and reduced government
borrowing. Price stability was declared the key goal of monetary policy in the long run.
The March 1995 measures included a major change in the nominal exchange rate regime5
that was intended to create credibility for economic policy and reduce the uncertainty associated
with future policy measures so as to restore inventors' confidence in the system (Nemenyi, 1997).
Following a 9 percent devaluation of the official exchange rate, a preannounced crawling band
exchange rate system was introduced in March 1995. The band of permitted fluctuations was set
at 2.25 percent on either side of the parity, and thus has been maintained until recently. The rate
of crawl was set according to an inflation target. The initial monthly rate was 1.9 percent and it
was gradually reduced to 0.3 percent in April 2000. The official currency basket was changed to
70 percent DM and 30 percent U.S. dollar in January 1997 and the DM was replaced by the euro
in January 1998. In January 2000, the exchange rate was completely tied to the euro. Table 2
provides a summary of  the exchange rate measures in Hungary during the 1990-2000 period.
 In sum, the post-1995 exchange rate regime in Hungary focused on the stability of the
nominal exchange rate as a tool of disinflation and on preventing significant real appreciation of
the forint in order to sustain the current account balance and to control capital inflows (Orlowski,
2000).  In addition, Hungary experienced some shock therapy, e.g. the bankruptcy legislation
introduced in the early 1990s.  It received a significant amount of foreign direct investment.  As a
result, supply shocks should play a key role in output and price movements. The 1995 Bokros
package also contained elements of shock therapy, including drastic cuts in budget spending,
devaluation of the forint, change to a crawling peg and the introduction of import surcharges.  
Thus, we also expect that aggregate demand shocks in a broader sense to affect inflation and
output growth during our sample period.
2.2.  Poland6
The stabilization of the Polish economy began under much less favorable conditions than
those found in Hungary. In 1989, inflation peaked at 54.8% per month, the government deficit
was nearly 8% of GDP and both loss-making Polish firms and the government deficit were
financed by rapid expansion of money and credit. Although the government began to deal with the
crisis in late 1989, the major stabilization program began on January 1, 1990 with the Balcerowicz
Plan. The zloty (zl) was devalued from 5,560 zl/US$ to 9,500 zl/US$ and pegged at the latter
rate. Monetary and fiscal policies were tightened, enabling the government to achieve a surplus
equivalent to 2.8 % of GDP in 1990 (Table 3) and credit creation was sharply curtailed (Brada
and Kutan, 1999). The consequences of stabilization and liberalization were sufficiently virulent,
both in the upsurge in prices and in the decline in production, to lead to an easing of
macroeconomic policy late in 1990. However, the effects of this policy change were felt more in
an acceleration of inflation than in real output growth (Wellisz, 1997) and the government soon
abandoned this effort. As the recession deepened in 1991, the fiscal deficit reappeared and high
inflation reduced the competitiveness of Polish exports. The zloty was devalued by 17 % in May
1991, and its peg was shifted to a basket of currencies.
 Policy priorities gradually shifted from stabilization to stimulating growth (Krzak, 1996). 
Although the fiscal deficit was cut from 4.9 % of GDP in 1992 to 2.7 % in 1993 (Table 3), a level
around which it has fluctuated since, monetary policy was relatively expansionary. While real
interest rates remained positive, money supply and credit growth consistently outpaced the targets
set by the National Bank of Poland (NBP). The zloty’s peg was abandoned in October of 1991,
replaced by a crawling peg in the same month with a preannounced devaluation of 1.8% per
month against a basket of currencies (Nuti, 2000). Over time, the rate of depreciation has been7
reduced and there have also been one-off devaluations and revaluations to accommodate
exogenous shocks. In 1995, the band within which the zloty could fluctuate was widened to ±7%.
Poland’s exchange rate policy was sufficiently credible to foreign investors that short-term capital
inflows began to be a problem for the NBP by 1995 when, even with some NBP sterilization,
capital inflows accounted for 59% of the growth of the money supply (Krzak, 1996). As a result,
controlling the money supply became more difficult for the monetary authorities. We thus expect
that balance of payments and monetary shocks have played a significant role in inflation and
output movements during our sample period. Table 4 provides a summary of exchange rate policy
regimes in Poland during 1990-1999. 
Although Poland has had a higher rate of inflation than Hungary over the decade of the
 1990s, it has also had a faster rate of growth of real GDP (Table 3). Relatively higher growth in
Poland may be due as much to an earlier start in implementing economic reforms as to better
economic policy. Analogously, Poland's higher rate of inflation may reflect its more severe initial
macroeconomic disequilibrium rather than an inability to restrain the growth of the money supply.
Recently, output growth has slowed somewhat due to a fall in exports to Russia and the Ukraine
caused by the financial crises in those countries. As inflation has slackened and as the nominal
anchor of the crawling peg has decreased in importance with a further widening of the bands,
Poland has adopted inflation targeting (Brada and Kutan, 1999).  In 1998, the Monetary Policy
Council set a goal of lowering Polish inflation to 6.8-7.8% in 1999 and 4% as measured by the
CPI by the year 2003. As shown in Table 3, the inflation rate for 1999 was 9.8 %, which is much
higher  than the estimates made by the Council for 1999. In addition, the preliminary estimates of
inflation rate was 8.5 %  in 2000, suggesting that the inflation targeting policy has not been very8
effective so far  in Poland.
In summary, Poland moved gradually from a rigid fixed exchange rate targeting regime to
a more flexible system with wide bands over time. Monetary policy in Hungary was geared to
nominal exchange rate stability and radical measures were taken that generated substantial real
shocks to the economy.  Hence one may expect a higher incidence of monetary shocks and a
smaller role for real shocks in  Poland than in Hungary and vice versa.
3. The Dynamic Effects of the Shocks: An Illustrative Model
This section presents a dynamic aggregate supply, aggregate demand model that
incorporates some important elements of an economy in transition, namely balance of payments
problems and finite capital mobility. The model is consistent with a vertical long-run Phillips
curve, and represents a middle ground between market clearing approaches and models based on
short run nominal inertia and nominal rigidities.  Models of this nature have been applied
extensively to explain macroeconomic fluctuations (e.g., Shapiro and Watson, 1988; Blanchard
and Quah, 1989; Gali, 1992; Karras, 1994; Ahmed and Park, 1994) and real exchange rate
fluctuations (Clarida and Gali, 1994; Weber, 1997). Moreover, Quah and Vahey (1995) propose a
technique for measuring core inflation based on aggregate demand neutrality: Core inflation is
defined as that component of measured inflation that has no long-run impact on real output, a
notion consistent with the vertical long-run Phillips curve. Recently, Wehinger (2000) use this
aggregate demand neutrality to derive core inflation for the G7 countries and we follow a similar
strategy in this paper. 9
In order to motivate the restrictions embedded in the structural VAR model, consider a
dynamic open economy aggregate supply- aggregate demand model with finite capital mobility:
ht = ht-1 + ,t
h Oil price  (1)
yt
s = $t - 2 ht  Aggregate supply  (2)
$t = $t-1 + ,t
s     Evolution of capacity output  (3)
k [it - it* + (Etst+1 - st) - Dt] +01(st-pt) - 02yt + bt = 0    Balance of Payments (BOP) (4)
it = (Etst+1 - st) - (01/k)  (st-pt) + (02/k) yt + [it* + Dt - (1/k)bt]   (4')
zt = [it* + Dt - (1/k)bt]   (5')
zt = zt-1 + ,t
z “BOP” shock  (5)
yt
d = dt - ([it- Et(pt+1-pt)] +  01(st-pt) - 02yt  Aggregate demand/IS  (6)
dt = dt-1 + ,t
d Aggregate demand shock (7)
mt





m Money supply  (9)
yt
s = yt
d = yt Goods market equilibrium  (10)
mt
s = mt
d = mt Money market equilibrium  (11)
where h is the real world oil price, y is domestic output, $ is capacity output, i is domestic
nominal interest rate, i* is the foreign interest rate, s is the exchange rate expressed as the
domestic currency price of foreign currency, p is the domestic price level, m is the money stock, d
is autonomous aggregate demand, D is a risk premium on domestic currency investments, b 
represents an exogenous shift in net exports due to e.g., a change in competitiveness, z represents
exogenous elements in the balance of payments equation, Et is the expectations operator10
conditional on information available at time t, all variables except interest rates are in logarithms,
and  all parameters are assumed positive. 
Equation (1) is the evolution of the world oil price, which is assumed to be exogenous.
Equation (2) is an aggregate supply equation, where aggregate supply depends on capacity output
and world oil price. Capacity output in equation (3) is a function of the productive capacity of the
economy (e.g., capital stock and employment), and for simplicity, it is assumed to be a random
walk process. 
A distinguishing feature of the model is that, due to risk premiums and fads, uncovered
interest parity does not hold. Capital inflows are a function of the net domestic rate of return
adjusted for a risk premium. Note that the parameter k represents the degree of capital mobility
and large values of k indicate higher levels of capital mobility. The trade balance is a function of
the real exchange rate
2 (st - pt) and domestic income. Moreover, due to exogenous changes in
terms of trade, bt represents exogenous increases in net exports. Although equation (4) may seem
to impose a zero balance of payments, the existence of the shift term bt provides a more general
specification. For example, one can view bt as an exogenous level for the balance of payments.
Equation (4') rewrites equation (4) in terms of the domestic nominal interest rate while equation
(5') pools all the exogenous elements in the balance of payments equation to define zt. Equation
(5) specifies the evolution of zt as a non-stationary stochastic process
3. 
Equation (6) is an aggregate demand (IS) equation where aggregate spending depends on
the expected real interest rate and net exports. The autonomous portion of aggregate demand, dt,
is assumed to follow a random walk in equation (7). Equation (8) is a conventional money








































exogenous elements in the balance of payments. This specification allows for reductions in money
demand when there are exogenous shifts in the balance of payments that necessitate a depreciation
of domestic currency. The exogenous BOP shock in money demand is meant to allow for
currency substitution.  It is known that currency substitution is prevalent in inflationary
environments. Moreover, when there is a risk premium associated with domestic currency or there
exist self-fulfilling fads in exchange rate expectations, zt will be positive. In such cases, money
demand is reduced by µzt.
Equation (9) is the evolution of money supply, which for simplicity, is assumed to follow a
random walk
4. Finally we close the model by postulating goods and money market equilibrium
relationships (equations 10 and 11) and proceed to solve the model for the rational expectations
equilibrium.
In order to solve the model, we eliminate the interest rate from equations (6) and (8) using
equation (4') to obtain the following system:
The system can be written compactly as AYt = B Et Yt+1 + Wt, or  Yt = A Et Yt+1 +CWt where C =
A
-1  and A= A
-1B. The eigenvalues of the matrix A are {1/(1+8); (k / ((k + ( 01+ 01k)}. The
eigenvalues are both within the unit circle for finite values of the parameters, hence the forward
looking solution is convergent. The forward looking solution to the system in (12) is12
EtYt%1 ’ C j
4
i’1
Ai Et Wt%i%1 (13)
pt ’ mt&c1yt&c2zt&c3dt (16)
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Given the stochastic processes for the exogenous variables, it is evident that Et Wt+i = Wt for i = 1,
2, ...  Then the solutions for the real exchange rate, real money balances, and the price level in
terms of the exogenous variables are:
The observed movements in the vector of variables Xt = [ht  yt  (mt-pt) (st-pt) pt]’ are due to five







oil price shocks, ,t
h; aggregate supply shocks, ,t
s;  BOP shocks, ,t
z; aggregate demand shocks, ,t
d;
and money supply shocks
5, ,t
m. 
It can be shown that the long run impact of the structural shocks on the endogenous
variables has a specific structure. In order to show the long run effect of structural shocks, ,t, on
Xt  we express the solution to the model in first differences:























Ai,t&i ’ A(L),t (22)
)yt = - 2 ,t
h + ,t
s  (18)
)(mt-pt) = c1 (,t
s - 2 ,t
h ) + c2 ,t
z + c3 ,t
d  (19)
)pt = c1 2 ,t
h - c1 ,t
s - c2 ,t
z - c3 ,t
d + ,t
m  (21)
Note from equations (15) and (21) that the long run effect of  a BOP shock on the price
level depends on the degree of capital mobility and on the magnitude of the semi-interest elasticity
of money, 8, relative to the elasticity of money demand with respect to a BOP deterioration, µ.
Assuming k is sufficiently large,  the coefficient c2 in equation (21) reduces to 8-µ. When µ < 8 (µ
> 8), the predicted effect of a BOP shock on the price level is positive (negative). Consequently,
the long run effect of a BOP shock on the price level is an empirical question. Similarly the long
run effect of a supply shock on the price level can be of either sign. Notice  that although all
endogenous variables are unit root stochastic processes, the vector Xt is difference stationary.
Finally, the long run impact of the structural shocks on the endogenous variables is “near-
triangular”, which we show in the next section.
Identification of the Shocks
Since the vector )Xt is covariance stationary, it can be written as an infinite moving
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where A(L) is a matrix whose elements are polynomials in the lag operator L. Denote the
elements of A(L) by aij(L). The time path of the effects of a shock in ,j on variable i after k
periods can be denoted Tij(k). We also adopt the notation such that A(1) is the matrix of long run
effects whose elements are denoted aij(1); each element gives the cumulative effect of a shock in ,j
on variable i over time. Similarly, A0 is the matrix of the contemporaneous impact effects and
consists of Tij(0).  The objective of identification is to discern the 25 elements of A0. Given the
model structure above, the long run effects of the shocks on the endogenous variables are given
by
Note that the matrix of long run effects is lower triangular except that a34(1) is not zero. The
system in (23) provides 9 restrictions toward identification. Given the 15 restrictions embedded in
the variance covariance matrix, an additional restriction is needed to identify the shocks. 
For a sufficiently high level of capital mobility, aggregate demand shocks have no long run
effect on real money balances. An aggregate demand shock in this case has no effect on real
interest rates and any autonomous changes in aggregate demand have to be offset by a nominal
and real appreciation of domestic currency. As a result, net exports decline and aggregate demand
shocks have no long run effect on prices or real money balances under perfect capital mobility.
Perfect capital mobility implies that the coefficient c3 = - 8/((+k) in equations (15) and (19) and15
the long run response a34(1) in equation (23) is zero. In the empirical model, it is fairly
straightforward to re-estimate the model for non-zero values of a34(1) corresponding to limited
capital mobility. This enables us to  assess the sensitivity of the results to varying degrees of
capital mobility.
4. Empirical Results
Our benchmark model consists of the system in (23) with “high capital mobility” where
a34(1) = 0. After estimating the model, we  perform variance decompositions and impulse
response analyses to study the dynamic effects of real oil price, aggregate supply, balance of
payments, real demand, and monetary shocks on the price level and output. We then use
simulations based on historical realizations of the orthogonal shocks to construct estimates of
“core” inflation. The data are monthly from January 1990 through April 2000. The measures of
the variables are: ht = real domestic price of crude oil (West Texas crude oil converted to
domestic currency using period average exchange rate and deflated by the producer price index),
yt = industrial production index, qt = real effective exchange rate, pt = consumer price index, mt =
M3 for Hungary, and M2 for Poland. Most series are from CD ROM edition of the International
Financial Statistics, except the following: Industrial Production in Poland is taken from Plan
Econ Inc.; West Texas crude oil price is from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis FRED®
database; M3 in Hungary is from the National Bank of Hungary. All data are seasonally adjusted
using the Census X-11 additive method.
In order to properly specify the VAR, variables ought to be tested for unit roots.
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests for the levels and first differences  of the variables are16
given in Table 5. The ADF test statistics seem to be sensitive to the lag length, hence we present
sample autocorrelation coefficients for the variables as well. The sample ADF test statistics
indicate that all variables are stationary in the first differences at the 5 percent significance level.
However, the real exchange rate and the price level in Poland appear stationary.  Moreover,  real
money balances in Poland and the real  exchange rate and the price level in Hungary seem on the
borderline of a unit root process. Sample autocorrelation coefficients for price levels and real
exchange rates clearly suggest a unit root process in real exchange rates and prices in both
countries. Moreover an AR(1) coefficient of 0.98 and a slowly decaying autocorrelation function
in the real money balances in Poland point to a unit root process. For the empirical model, we
proceed with the assumption that all variables are unit root processes in levels, and stationary in
first differences
6.
We then let )Xt = [)ht )yt )(mt-pt) )(st-pt) )pt] and estimate the VAR for Poland and
Hungary. Starting with a maximum lag of 8, we pare down the model depending on the joint
significance of maximum lag coefficients. Likelihood ratio tests indicate that the model can be
pared down to 4 lags for Hungary and 6 lags for Poland. In order to preserve symmetry and
capture possible dynamics, we estimate the VAR with six lags for both countries. The transition
process by its very nature involves structural change. Moreover, both countries introduced major
stabilization programs in 1995. In order to test for structural change, we divide the sample into
two sub-periods: 1990.2-1994.12 and 1995.1-2000.4. We then test for structural change using a
multivariate version of the Chow test. The estimated test statistic yields P
2(155) = 428.14 for
Hungary and P
2(155) = 434.22 for Poland.  Both statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis of no
structural change. In order to account for the structural change, we include a dummy variable for17
both countries (d = 1 for t $ 1995:1 and zero otherwise) in the VAR. We then implement the
identification strategy outlined above, and proceed with innovation accounting analysis typical of
VARs.
Impulse Response Functions
Figure 1 presents responses of the price level to each shock (real oil price, supply, balance
of payments, demand, and monetary) for Poland and Hungary. We present both median responses 
and a 90 percent confidence band based on bootsrapping with 1000 draws for the impulse
response functions. The figure indicates that the response of the price level to a real oil price
shock is insignificant in both countries. The effect of a supply shock on prices is similar to a
closed economy case where prices fall in response to an aggregate supply shock in both Poland
and Hungary. The effect of a BOP shock is negative but mostly insignificant in Poland. This
indicates that a BOP shock has a demand deflating effect.
The effect of an aggregate demand shock on prices is positive and significant in both
countries. Prices gradually rise in response to a monetary shock suggesting some nominal inertia
in both Poland and Hungary. Prices level off after a year in both countries. 
The response of output to various shocks is given in Figure 2. Output falls slightly in
response to an oil price shock and then rises in both countries although the response is mostly
statistically insignificant. Output effects of supply shocks are positive and significant as expected.
As in the price level, a BOP shock has some demand deflating effect, and output mostly falls in
response to a BOP deterioration. However, the response is statistically insignificant. A real
demand shock is expansionary in both countries even though the response is  not significant in
Hungary. Similarly, monetary shocks seem to have output expansionary effects. Although the18
effect is mostly insignificant in Poland, there is a pronounced and significant impact effect of a
monetary shock in Hungary. Overall, the results are broadly consistent with the implications of the
aggregate supply - aggregate demand model.
Variance Decompositions
Table 6 presents variance decompositions of the price level and output under the
assumption of perfect capital mobility. At short term forecasting horizons, real demand shocks
play an important role in explaining the price level in Poland, followed by supply and BOP shocks.
In Hungary, supply shocks seem to play the dominant role in price level movements although real
demand shocks are still important in the short run. These findings are consistent with our prior
expectations as discussed in Section 2.
For both countries, monetary shocks are negligible in explaining price level movements in
the short run. In the long run, aggregate demand, supply, and monetary shocks play almost
equally in price level movements in Poland while supply shocks seem to dominate the price level
in Hungary. Notice the absence of any major role for real oil price shocks in influencing price level
movements in both countries. Moreover, although monetary shocks do not play a major role in
price level movements in the long run, they seem to explain a moderate proportion of price level
movements in Poland. This may be attributed to the exchange rate based stabilization programs
which tend to limit monetary discretion that have been implemented in both countries.
Variance decompositions of output reveal interesting patterns. First, in both countries
supply shocks explain a sizable proportion of output movements in both countries. Second,
balance of payments and real oil price shocks are negligible in both countries. On the other hand,
aggregate demand shocks in the broad sense (real demand vs. monetary shocks) seem to play a19
different role in explaining output movements in each country. This finding supports the
arguments made by  Brada (1998) and Desai (1997, 1998) that different initial conditions and
macroeconomic policy between the two countries are likely to yield different outcomes for the
behavior of output and other key macroeconomic variables.
While both types of demand shocks are constrained to have no long run effect on output,
the short run effect can be substantial. Indeed, monetary shocks seem to dominate output
movements in Hungary in the short run while real demand shocks appear to be modest. In Poland,
real demand shocks play a moderate to important role in output movements in the short run while
monetary shocks are negligible. Overall, aggregate demand policies in the broad sense seem to
have a significant role in the short run in both countries.
Imperfect capital mobility and alternative specifications
For transition economies, it may not be reasonable to assume perfect capital mobility
particularly in the initial stages of transition  since institutional infrastructure was in its infancy and
there was more currency as well as political risk. However, the leading transition economies today
possess almost prefect capital mobility as currency convertibility in both current and capital
accounts is introduced.
 In this section, we assess the sensitivity of the results to the degree of capital mobility. To
that end, we estimate the model with limited capital mobility corresponding to non-zero values of
the coefficient c3. Recall that the parameter k measures the degree of capital mobility so c3 = -
8/((+k)  determines the long run effect of aggregate demand impulses on real money balances.
We gauge the effect of limited capital mobility by estimating the model for a finite k. We set the
long run effect of aggregate demand shocks on the demand for real money balances at a34(1) =  -20
0.009 standard deviations for Hungary and Poland
7. Variance decompositions from this model are
summarized in Table 7.
Limited capital mobility evidently has no bearing on the relative importance of real oil
price, supply, or monetary shocks in explaining the price level or output. The effects of limited
capital mobility can be summarized as follows: The importance of real demand shocks in
explaining the price level in Hungary increases in the long run. In Poland, there is a reverse
tendency: the effect of real demand shocks on the price level is somewhat diminished.. As for
output, real demand (BOP) shocks explain a higher proportion of output movements in Hungary
(Poland) under limited capital mobility. These results are more consistent with our prior
expectations about the importance of monetary and real shocks in affecting prices and output as
discussed in Section 2.
Overall, the assumption regarding capital mobility does not seem to alter the results
substantially for Hungary. However the results are somewhat sensitive to capital mobility in
Poland in that the role of real demand and BOP shocks change depending on capital mobility
8.
In order to assess the sensitivity of the results to different specifications of the VAR and
sample periods, we estimated various models. First, we estimated the model with unit root
inflation and output processes. The estimated impulse responses from this model did not conform
to theoretical overidentification restrictions implied by the AS/AD model. Recall that a supply
shock has a positive effect on the price level and money supply shock has a contractionary effect
on output. We also estimated the model for 1992-2000 excluding the initial transition period.
Results from this model show high  standard errors in that most impulse responses are21
insignificant, perhaps due to insufficient observations. Therefore we conclude that the benchmark
model provides  the most plausible representation of the data.
Core Inflation
Following Quah and Vahey (1995), we construct “core inflation” by eliminating supply
side influences (oil price shocks and supply shocks). The remaining “demand driven inflation”
based on historical realizations of balance of payments shocks, real demand shocks, and monetary
shocks gives an idea about the extent of policy induced inflation.
9  The deterministic part of the
simulated inflation is included in the core inflation estimate. If a substantial portion of total
inflation is demand driven or “core inflation”, there is room for policies aimed at limiting
discretionary demand policies to bring down inflation and stabilize the economy. A decomposition
of inflation based on  historical realizations of the shocks is given in Figure 3. A core inflation
measure higher than total inflation indicates that favorable supply side effects featured strongly to
bring down inflation.
Figure 3 reveals several interesting features of the inflation period in Poland and Hungary.
First, in both countries core inflation was never far below total inflation
10 during the entire sample
period except at the beginning of the transition in Poland. As a mater of fact, in the second half of
the 1990s there is a moderating effect of favorable supply shocks on total inflation. Inflation
moderating favorable supply shocks show no particular pattern for Poland but are strongly visible
in Hungary after 1995. One can conjecture that the upgrading of old technologies through foreign
direct investment, increase in product quality and structure, decline in unit labor costs, and
introduction of the post-95 measures have been some of the main driving forces of the observed
increase in output and decline in inflation in Hungary. 22
Given the negligible non-core inflation and oftentimes moderating supply side influences
on inflation, the historical decomposition of inflation has important policy implications. If we
assume that core inflation is mostly induced by discretionary demand policies, commitment
mechanisms that limit discretionary policies have a good chance of stabilizing the economy.
5. Conclusions
Using a rational expectations, dynamic aggregate supply and aggregate demand model
with limited capital mobility and structural VARs, we have attempted to decompose inflation and
output movements into those attributable to real oil price, supply, balance of payments, real
demand, and monetary shocks. Variance decompositions results have indicated that supply shocks
explain a preponderance of price level movements in Hungary while demand shocks are dominant
in price level movements in Poland. On the other hand, monetary shocks are an important source
of output fluctuations in the short run in Hungary suggesting nominal inertia. In Poland, real
demand shocks affect output in the short run (up to one year), while monetary shocks are
negligible. We have found that these findings are not overly sensitive to the assumption regarding
capital mobility. These results support the view  that different initial conditions and different
starting times of stabilization programs, as well as, different approaches to monetary and
exchange rate policy in Poland and Hungary have resulted in different factors driving output and
inflation [Brada (1998) and Desai (1997, 1998)]. 
Our results have suggested that aggregate demand policies in the broad sense have played
a significant role in the short run in both countries. This may be related to the relative fixity of the
exchange rate regimes that Poland and Hungary adopted in the 1990s. The relative effectiveness
of real demand policies is compatible with the view that floating rates steepen the short run23
Phillips curve trade-off (Dornbusch and Krugman 1976).  Accordingly, even if demand policies
are not stable, fixed rates provide a framework that stabilizes their effects. For example, an
expansionary policy adopted in response to an imminent decline in economic activity under fixed
exchange rates is more likely to raise output and employment rather than wages if it is not
expected to persist (Alogoskoufis and Smith 1991;  Eichengreen, 1993). Moreover, expansionary
demand policies  produce larger increases in output and employment under credible fixed
exchange rates when inflation is not expected to persist, as compared to flexible exchange rates.
In that regard, it is important for these countries to continue to have some form of  fixed
exchange rate regime before any formal peg to the Euro.
Empirical evidence has indicated that supply shocks have been a key determinant of output
and prices in both short and long run in both countries. Therefore, it is important for both
countries to put more emphasis on supply side policies that increase productivity over time.
Estimates of core inflation based on historical realizations of the shocks have indicated a major
component of inflation has been demand driven, core, inflation. Therefore, it is important that 
policymakers restrain discretionary demand policies to lower inflation.
Our results have important implications for full membership preparations of Hungary and
Poland  in the EU and lessons for other candidate countries.  Based on our empirical findings, it
appears that a combination of discretionary demand policies along with supply-side reforms that
emphasize productivity enhancement and investment in new technology would be important
factors to lower inflation and increase output growth in both countries, thus increasing their
chances of full membership in the EU. In addition, unfavorable supply shocks would hurt the
attempts of lowering inflation and achieving a sustainable output growth in both countries,
perhaps significantly delaying the timing of  full EU membership for the candidate countries.24
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Table 1 – Hungary: Macroeconomic Indicators 1991 to 2000
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real GDP growth  (%) -11.9 -3.1 -0.6 2.9 1.5 1.4 4.6 4.9 4.2 5.2
CPI rate of inflation (%)   34.2 23.0 22.5 18.9 28.3 23.5 18.3 14.3 10.0 9.8
In % of GDP:
Current account balance 0.8 0.9 -9.0 -9.4 -5.6 -3.7 -2.1 -4.8 -4.3 -3.9
Government deficit
a    3.0   7.0   6.5 8.4 6.7 3.1 4.9 4.8 3.7 3.8
Public debt
Consolidated
b 66.9 65.0 84.3 83.2 85.4 71.7 63.6 63.5 66.3 62.8
Non-consolidated
c 74.7 79.0 90.8 88.3 86.5 72.6 63.7 62.1 60.9 56.7
Note: Figures for 2000 are preliminary.
a Based on official data reported in Kiss and Szapary (Table 2, 2000), which includes transactions of  the central
government, the social security funds, the local authorities, and the extra-budgetary funds. For details,  see Kiss and
Szapary (2000).
b Government and National Bank of Hungary, excluding the sterilization instruments of the central bank, see Kiss and
Szapary  (Table 1,2000)
c Non-consolidated with the National Bank of Hungary. For details, see Kiss and Szapary (Table 1,2000)27
 Table 2 – Exchange rate policy measures in Hungary: 1990-2000
Dates Currency basket Rate Adjustment
32873 Introduction of an adjustable fixed
rate regime based on the currency
composition of previous year’s foreign
trade until December 8, 1991
 December 9, 1991 50% USD-50% ECU -
 March 16, 1992 1.90
 June 24 1.60

















36962 Introduction of preannounced
crawling peg adjustments
9




35430 70% DM-30% US$ -
April 1 0.036
37117 0.033
January 1, 1998 0.030
June 15  0.026
37164 0.023




36525 100 % EURO 0.013
36981 0.01
Source: National Bank of Hungary, various annual and monthly Reports.28
Table 3. Poland: Macroeconomic Indicators 1990 to 2000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000  
GDP real growth rate -11.6 -7.0 2.6 3.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 6.9 4.8 4.1 4.1
CPI rate of inflation 249 60.4 44.3 37.6 29.5 21.6 18.5 13.2 8.6 9.8 8.5
In % of GDP:
Current Account balance 5.2 -2.8 -3.7 -2.7 -1 4.3 -0.9 -3 -4.3 -7.5 -6.1
General government balance
a 2.8 -1.8 -4.9 -2.3 -2.7 -2.6 -2.5 -1.3 -2.4 -2.0 -2.2




69.0 59.0 53.6 49.4 43.0 na 42.0
Notes:
a General government includes the state, municipalities and extra-budgetary funds.  General government balance 
includes privatization receipts. Figures for 2000 are preliminary.
Sources: EBRD Transition Report, various issues, EIU and national statistics29
Table 4. Exchange Rate Policy in Poland 1990-1999
Date Regime
January 1990 Fixed exchange rate against the US $ (After a 31.6% devaluation on January 1,
1990)
May 1991 Fixed rate against a basket of 5 currencies (after a 17% devaluation). 
Currency basket: 45% US$, 35% DM, 10% British Pounds, 5% French franc, 5%
CHF
October 1991 Crawling peg, pre-announced crawling devaluation at a monthly rate of 1.8%
February 1992 10.7% Devaluation
August 1993 7.4% Devaluation; monthly crawling rate 1.6%
September 1994 Monthly crawling rate 1.5%
November 1994 Monthly crawling rate 1.4%
February 1995 Monthly crawling rate 1.2%
May 1995 Crawling band, widened band (+/- 7%), same crawling rate
December 1995 6% Revaluation
January 1996 Monthly crawling rate 1.0%
February 1998 Band widened to +/- 10%, monthly crawl 0.8%
July 1998 Monthly crawling rate 0.65%
September 1998 Monthly crawling rate 0.5%
October 1998 Band widened to +/- 12.5%
January 1999 New currency basket:  55% EURO, 45% US$
March 1999 Band widened to +/- 15%, monthly crawling rate 0.3%. 
Source: Adapted from Nuti (2000)30
Table 5. Stationarity: Autocorrelation and ADF Statistics
qt pt mt-pt yt ht )qt )pt )(mt-pt) )yt )ht
POLAND
Autocorrelations (Dk)
k = 1 0.91 0.97 0.98 0.94 0.92 0.22 0.65 -0.11 -0.4 0.29
k = 6 0.66 0.82 0.87 0.86 0.55 0.08 0.44 -0.01 0.22 -0.11
k = 12 0.42 0.67 0.73 0.75 0.12 0.02 0.35 0.26 0.61 -0.1
ADF Jµ Statistic
-4.49 -4.6 -2.85 1.49 -0.39 -6.65 -3.04 -6.34 -8.8 -7.33
Lags 1 2 1 1 3 1 3 1 1 2
HUNGARY
Autocorrelations (Dk)
k = 1 0.95 0.98 0.98 0.84 0.97 0.16 0.23 0.14 -0.4 0.05
k = 6 0.72 0.86 0.81 0.66 0.81 -0.15 -0.1 -0.06 0.35 0
k = 12 0.5 0.72 0.54 0.6 0.66 -0.12 0.51 -0.01 0.59 0.23
ADF Jµ Statistic
-2.85 -2.48 -0.6 -1.59 0 -3.87 -5.92 -7.55 -3.5 -7.93
Lags 7 2 1 3 2 6 1 1 2 2
Notes:  The critical value of the ADF Jµ test at the 5 % significance level is -2.89.  
The maximum lag for the ADF test is selected by the Schwarz Criterion.31
Table 6. Variance Decomposition of the Price Level and Output: High Capital Mobility
Poland Hungary













1 4.0 26.1 23.9 41.9 4.0 15.0 50.1 6.1 28.4 0.4
6 4.8 31.7 12.1 34.5 16.8 8.1 58.8 6.5 20.8 5.9
12 1.8 29.7 8.8 37.0 22.7 2.4 66.0 7.9 10.2 13.4
18 1.6 29.8 8.8 36.2 23.6 1.9 63.8 11.0 8.3 15.0
24 1.7 30.2 8.9 35.3 23.9 2.8 61.0 13.2 6.9 16.0
30 1.9 30.6 9.0 34.6 24.0 3.7 58.7 14.9 6.3 16.3
36 2.0 30.9 9.0 34.1 24.0 4.5 57.1 16.0 5.9 16.5
k Output
1 0.9 58.5 1.7 32.2 6.7 0.1 24.4 8.5 12.8 54.2
6 12.6 63.8 0.6 14.7 8.2 11.7 36.3 8.9 6.9 36.3
12 9.8 76.8 0.8 7.8 4.7 15.5 53.6 7.4 3.8 19.7
18 8.3 82.9 0.6 5.1 3.1 14.1 66.7 5.2 2.2 11.7
24 7.0 86.5 0.5 3.7 2.3 11.6 75.3 3.6 1.5 8.0
30 6.2 88.8 0.4 2.8 1.8 9.6 80.5 2.7 1.2 6.1
36 5.5 90.4 0.3 2.3 1.4 8.2 83.7 2.2 1.0 532
Table 7. Variance Decomposition of the Price Level and Output: Low Capital Mobility
Poland Hungary













1 4.0 26.2 15.0 50.8 4.0 15.0 50.1 6.4 28.0 0.4
6 4.8 31.7 15.8 30.8 16.8 8.1 58.8 3.7 23.5 5.9
12 1.8 29.7 19.0 26.7 22.7 2.4 66.0 1.0 17.1 13.4
18 1.6 29.8 18.3 26.7 23.6 1.9 63.8 0.6 18.7 15.0
24 1.7 30.2 17.6 26.6 23.9 2.8 61.0 0.8 19.4 16.0
30 1.9 30.6 17.1 26.4 24.0 3.7 58.7 0.9 20.3 16.3
36 2.0 31.0 16.7 26.3 24.0 4.5 57.1 1.1 20.9 16.5
k Output
1 0.9 58.6 32.6 1.3 6.7 0.1 24.5 0.8 20.6 54.0
6 12.6 63.9 13.1 2.1 8.2 11.6 36.4 1.5 14.2 36.2
12 9.8 76.8 6.4 2.2 4.7 15.4 53.7 1.5 9.7 19.7
18 8.3 82.9 4.1 1.6 3.1 14.1 66.8 1.4 6.0 11.7
24 7.0 86.6 2.9 1.2 2.3 11.6 75.3 1.0 4.1 7.9
30 6.2 88.9 2.3 0.9 1.8 9.5 80.5 0.8 3.1 6.0
36 5.5 90.4 1.8 0.8 1.4 8.2 83.7 0.6 2.5 4.933
1. Other transition economies, including the Czech Republic, are not included due to insufficient
observations for empirical analysis.  For most transition economies, data start either  in 1993 or
1994, which does not provide enough degrees of freedom to get reliable estimates using the
structural VAR model.  In a future study, we plan to include other transition economies and draw
more general conclusions.  In this sense, our paper is exploratory and provides an initial analysis
of this issue.
2. For simplicity, foreign prices are normalized to unity. In the empirical analysis we will use real
effective exchange rates, which does not assume unit foreign prices.
3. Although ,t
z is labeled a “balance of payments shock”, it is evident that it captures foreign
interest rate shocks, risk premium shocks, and competitiveness shocks. Without further structure,
it is impossible to disentangle ,t
z into its constituent parts. To keep the dimensions of the VAR
tractable, ,t
z will be a composite shock of the above.
4. In the empirical model, we do not restrict “exogenous variables” to follow any particular
process; the assumption of random walk is to illustrate identification restrictions. 
5. If one assumes a stable money demand function, ,t
m can be interpreted as a money supply
shock. However, if money demand is not stable, ,t
m will capture money supply shocks net of
money demand shocks.
6. Even though some variables appear stationary in levels (e.g., real exchange rates, price levels,
real money balances), an autoregressive coefficient near unity makes it impossible to invert the
VAR in order to obtain the moving average representation. Hence, based on a slowly decaying
ACF, we assume that these variables are unit root processes in levels.
7. A long run effect of 0.009 standard deviations is comparable in absolute value to an average
long run effect of a shock presented in Figure 1. Moreover, a34(1) coefficients in equation (23)
that are higher than 0.009 in absolute value did not converge.
8. Strictly speaking, real demand shocks and BOP shocks are indistinguishable under limited
capital mobility.
9. Demand driven inflation is only an approximation to policy induced inflation, as not all broadly
defined demand shocks are policy related.
10. The fact that supply shocks explain a sizable proportion of the forecast of error variance in the
price level is not inconsistent with a sizable core inflation. Variance decompositions give an idea
about the effects of various shocks of the same size while historical decompositions simulate the
series based on the historical incidence of the shocks. 
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monetaryFigure 2. Responses of Output
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